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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The Roberts Court and the First
Amendment
AN INTRODUCTION
Geoffrey R. Stonet
The following essay is adaptedfrom Geoffrey R. Stone's
introductory remarks presented at The Roberts Court and Free
Speech Symposium hosted by Brooklyn Law Review on Friday,
April 9, 2021, and his 2008 article, Free Speech in the Twenty-

First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century.1
What I would like to do in my introductory remarks is to
offer a very brief history of the evolution of First Amendment
jurisprudence leading up to the Roberts Court.2 My goal is to lay
the foundation for the discussion to follow. With this background
in mind, it will be easier to evaluate how the Roberts Court has
changed our First Amendment jurisprudence. As I hope to show,
by 2005, when Roberts joined the Court, we had an astonishingly
rich, multi-faceted, and often maddeningly complex free speech
jurisprudence. Specifically, I will try to identify the judgments
made by the Supreme Court over the preceding eighty-five. years
that most fundamentally shaped the framework of our preRoberts Court First Amendment doctrine.
The first fundamental judgment the pre-Roberts Court
made in giving meaning to the First Amendment was to reject
three strongly advocated approaches to interpreting that
Amendment. The first of these approaches, championed by
Justice Hugo Black, insisted that the First Amendment is an
t Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago.
1 Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from
the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273 (2008).
2 The "Roberts Court" refers to the period in which Justice John Roberts has
presided over the Supreme Court as chief justice. Chief Justice John Roberts was nominated
for the position by President George W. Bush in 2005 and remained as chief justice through
the publication of these introductory remarks. See Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https:/www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/46FU-4784].
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absolute-that is, "no law" means "no law."3 Ultimately, the Court
rejected this approach because the broad range of issues posed by
the First Amendment proved too varied and too complex to be
governed sensibly by a simple absolute protection-versus-noprotection dichotomy.4 In short, although "Congress shall make
no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,"5 the
challenge is to define what we mean by the "freedom of speech"
and the "freedom of the press" that may not be abridged.
Second, the Court rejected ad hoc balancing as a general
approach to First Amendment interpretation. Under this
approach, the Court's task would be to weigh the benefits of
restricting speech against the benefits of protecting speech in
each case in order to decide whether the challenged restriction is
reasonable.6 In theory, this approach seems sensible, but in
practice it proved unworkable. It turns out to be incredibly
difficult to identify and assess all of the many factors that should
go into this judgment on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the
application of ad hoc balancing would produce a highly uncertain,
unpredictable, and fact-dependent set of outcomes that would
leave speakers, police officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges in
a state of constant uncertainty. Thus, although this approach
arguably sought to ask the right question, it attempted to do so in
a manner that proved fatally unpredictable.?
The third approach the Court rejected in the years before
the Roberts Court was the notion that a single standard of
review should govern all First Amendment cases. Whether that
3 See Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874, 879 (1960)
(arguing that "[t]he phrase 'Congress shall make no law' is composed of plain words, easily
understood" and that the language is "absolute"); HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 43-63 (1968); Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 914-16 (1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S.
36, 60-62 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Hugo Black & Edmund Cahn, Justice
Black and FirstAmendment "Absolutes":A PublicInterview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1969).
4 For examples of cases that strained Justice Black's "absolutist" approach,
see Adderley v. Florida, 389 U.S. 39, 40-48 (1966) (Black, J., majority opinion), rejecting
the First Amendment right to speak on public property; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 27-28 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting), disagreeing with the holding that states cannot
constitutionally prohibit the use of the word "fuck" in public; and Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. School District, 393 U.S. 503, 515-26 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting),
disagreeing with the holding that students have a right to free speech.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See Laurent B. Franz, Is the FirstAmendment Law?-A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 729-30 (1963).
7 On ad hoc balancing, see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
583-84 (1978); and ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME

COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 93-97 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1968) (1962). Compare
Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1963) (supporting the Court's balancing test approach), with Franz, supra
note 6 (criticizing the Court's use of balancing test). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (on ad hoc balancing).
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standard is set at a high level of justification, such as clear and
present danger, strict scrutiny, or necessary to promote a

compelling government interest, or at a low level of justification,
such as reasonableness or rational basis review, it became
readily apparent that a one-size-fits-all standard would not do
the trick. Applied in a consistent manner, any single standard
would inevitably dictate implausible results, sometimes
insufficiently protective of free speech, sometimes insufficiently
respectful of competing government interests.8 Thus, the Court
concluded that there is no single test that can apply to all cases.
Now, when I say that these standards would dictate
results that would be unacceptably over- or underprotective of
free speech, what I am obviously assuming is that there is some
set of results that most reasonable people-including the
justices of the Supreme Court-would properly regard as clearly
"right" or clearly "wrong." And that, of course, assumes that we
have some intuitive sense of what the First Amendment sensibly
means. What I am suggesting, in other words, is that First
Amendment doctrine was built backwards-not from theory to
doctrine to results, but from intuited results to doctrine, with
only passing attention to theory. This is an important point, for
it suggests that First Amendment doctrine as we know it today
is largely the product of practical experience rather than
philosophical reasoning.
While the pre-Roberts Court was in the process of
rejecting these three proposed approaches to First Amendment
interpretation, it learned several practical lessons about the
workings of what Professor Thomas Emerson once called "the
system of freedom of expression"-lessons that played a critical
role in shaping its First Amendment jurisprudence.9

The first practical lesson the Court learned about was the
"chilling effect."10 That is, people are easily deterred, or chilled,

from exercising their freedom of speech, even when that speech
is fully protected by the First Amendment." This is so because
the individual speaker usually gains very little personally from
signing a petition, marching in a demonstration, handing out

leaflets, or posting on a blog. Put simply, except in the most
unusual circumstances, whether any particular individual
speaks or not is unlikely to have any appreciable impact on the
world. Thus, if the individual knows that he might go to jail for
S
9

See TRIBE, supra note 7, at 583-84.
See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970) (discussing the role and importance of free expression in a democratic society).
10 See id. at 158 (quoting Dombrowsi v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482, 487, 491 (1965)).
11 See id.
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speaking out, he will often forego his right to speak. This makes
perfect sense on an individual level. But, if many individuals
make this same decision, then, in the words of Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn, the net effect will often be to mutilate
"the thinking process of the community."12 Recognition of this
"chilling effect," and of the consequent power of the government
to use intimidation to silence its critics and to dominate and
manipulate public debate, was a critical insight in shaping the
pre-Roberts Court free speech doctrine.13
Second, the Court learned about what we might call the
"pretext effect."14 In other words, the Court learned that
government officials will often defend their restrictions of speech
on grounds quite different from their real motivations for the
suppression.15 Often, the actual grounds are to silence their
critics and to suppress ideas they do not like.16 The pretext effect
is not unique to the realm of free speech, but it is especially
potent in this context because public officials will often be sorely
tempted to silence dissent in order to insulate themselves from
criticism and preserve their own authority.
Of course, the very idea of the pretext effect turns on
what we mean by legitimate and illegitimate reasons for
restricting speech. The Court recognized that the First
Amendment forbids government officials from suppressing
particular ideas because such officials do not want citizens to
accept those ideas in the political process. This principle, which
was first clearly stated by the Supreme Court in 1919 in Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes's dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States,17 is central to contemporary First Amendment doctrine.
It rests at the very core of the pretext effect's strong suspicion of
any government regulation of speech that is consistent with such
an impermissible motive.18

12 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 26 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948); id. at 24-27.
13 On chilling effect, see Lamont v. PostmasterGeneral, 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965);
New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in
judgment); and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See
also Paul-A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1950).
14 On the pretext effect and improper motivation, see generally Elena Kagan,
PrivateSpeech, PublicPurpose:The Role of Government Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 415 (1996).
15
See id.
18 See id.
17 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18 See Kagan, supranote 14, at 414.
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The third practical lesson that the Court learned about is
what we might call the "crisis" effect.19 In times of crisis, real or
imagined, citizens and government officials tend to panic, to
grow desperately intolerant, and to rush headlong to suppress
speech they can demonize as dangerous, subversive, disloyal, or
unpatriotic.20 Painful experiences with this "crisis effect,"
especially during World War I and the Cold War, led us to embrace
what Professor Vincent Blasi has aptly termed a "pathological
perspective" in crafting First Amendment doctrine.21 That is, the
pre-Roberts Court learned to structure First Amendment doctrine
to anticipate and to guard against the worst of times.22
Returning to the question of standards of review, the preRoberts Court, having rejected absolutism, ad hoc balancing,
and the quest for a unitary standard of review, divided First
Amendment issues into a series of distinct problems. The Court
had the hope of addressing each problem separately and with a
specific standard that would be relatively predictable and easy
to administer, would approximate the results of ad hoc
balancing, and would guard against the chilling, pretext, and
crisis effects mentioned previously.
The critical step in the development of the pre-Roberts
Court's approach to standards of review was the Court's
recognition of the content based versus content neutral
distinction. Until roughly 1970, the Court did not clearly grasp
that laws regulating the content of expression pose a different
First Amendment issue than laws regulating expression without
regard to content. The Court first articulated this concept in an
otherwise uneventful 1970 decision, Schacht v. United States.23
In Schacht, the Court held that a content-neutral law that
banned more speech was less problematic under the First
Amendment than a content-based law that banned less speech.24
The holding in Schacht was a pivotal insight, and the
Court followed it up two years later with its decision in Police
Departmentof Chicago v. Mosley.26 There, the Court invalidated
a Chicago ordinance that prohibited peaceful picketers, except
peaceful labor picketers, from picketing near a school while the

19 See Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspectiveand the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450-51 (1985).
20 See id.
21 On the crisis effect and the pathological perspective, see GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 542-50 (2004). See generally Blasi, supranote 19.
22 See Blasi, supra note 19, at 450-51; STONE, supra note 21, at 542-50.
23 Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
24 Id. at 61-63.
25 Police Dep't of the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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school was in session.26 The Court assumed that a contentneutral ban on all picketing in such circumstances would be
constitutional.27 But, as in Schacht, the Court invalidated
the seemingly less speech-restrictive content-based ban,
explaining that because "[t]here is an 'equality of status in the
field of ideas,' [the] government must afford all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard."28 The Chicago ordinance, the
Court declared, "'slip[s] from . .. neutrality . .. into a concern
about content.' This is never permitted."29 The Court added that,
at the very least, such content-based regulations "must be
carefully scrutinized."30
With Schacht and Mosley, the Court entered a new era in
First Amendment jurisprudence. Ever since those decisions, the
first question to be asked in any First Amendment case is whether
the challenged regulation is content based or content neutral. For,
the answer to this question dictates the terms of the constitutional
inquiry. In brief, the rationale for analyzing content-based
restrictions differently from content-neutral restrictions, and for
being particularly suspicious of them, is that content-based
restrictions are more likely to skew public debate for or against
particular ideas and to be tainted by a constitutionally
impermissible motivation. The Court's recognition of this
distinction was a critical step in the evolution of pre-Roberts Court
free speech jurisprudence.
Another important pre-Roberts Court development was
the concept of low-value speech.31 One obvious problem with a
doctrine that presumptively holds all content-based restrictions
unconstitutional is that there may be some types of content that
do not merit such protection. Some speech might not sufficiently
further the values and purposes of the First Amendment to
warrant such extraordinary immunity from regulation. In part,
this was what Justice Holmes was getting at with his famous
false cry of fire example in Schenck v. United States.32
The Court first formally recognized the concept of low-value
speech in its 1942 decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.33 In
Id. at 92-93.
27 Id. at 98.
26

25

Id. at 96 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIELEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).

29 Id. at 99 (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
30 Id.
31 As explained below, low-value speech includes threats, fighting words, false
statements of fact, obscenity, and commercial advertising.
32 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
33 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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Chaplinsky, the Court declared that "[t]here are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech" that "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."34 Over the years, the pre-Roberts Court
came to characterize several categories of speech as "low value,"
including threats, fighting words, false statements of fact,
obscenity, and commercial advertising. Following Chaplinsky,
the Court has held that because these categories of expression
do not further core First Amendment values, they can be
restricted without

meeting

the usual

standards

of First

Amendment review.36
Originally, the Court treated "low-value" speech as
completely unprotected by the First Amendment. Restrictions of
such speech therefore received essentially no First Amendment
scrutiny.36 Since New York Times Company v. Sullivan37 in 1964,
however, the Court has increasingly abandoned the idea that
regulations of low-value speech are immune from First
Amendment review. Beginning with Sullivan, the Court has

recognized that restrictions of even low-value speech can pose
significant dangers to free expression.
In some instances, illustrated by the false statements of
fact at issue in Sullivan, low-value speech may itself have no
First Amendment value, but regulations of such speech may
have spillover or chilling effects on speech with important
First Amendment value. The threat of liability for false
statements of fact, for example, may chill speakers from making
even true statements. As the Court recognized in Sullivan,
regulations of low-value speech must take such effects into
account in order to pass constitutional muster.38 In other
instances, even low-value speech may have some First
Amendment value. This is illustrated by the Court's 1976
decision in Virginia Pharmacy,39 which held that although

commercial advertising may be of only low First Amendment
3

Id. at 571-72.

See id. at 572 (fighting words); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925)
(express incitement); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (threats); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (false statements of fact); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (commercial advertising);
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (threats).
3
See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (1960).
37 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38 Id. at 278.
3 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
5

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

140

[Vol. 87:1

value, it nonetheless serves a useful informational purpose and
must therefore be accorded significant, if not full, First
Amendment protection.
Using these two considerations regarding the First
Amendment value of low-value speech, the pre-Roberts Court
developed what Professor Melville Nimmer usefully described as
a process of categorical balancing with respect to these low-value
categories.40 The Court attempted to fine-tune the degree of
constitutional protection accorded to each category based upon
its relative First Amendment value and the risk of chilling
valuable expression.41
Another important pre-Roberts Court development also
involves content-based regulation but relates to what might be
described as the "special circumstances" exception to the strong
constitutional presumption against content-based regulation.
The key problem is that, even apart from low-value speech, an
almost absolute presumption against content regulation often
turns out to be too speech protective. There are some
circumstances, in other words, in which such a presumption
would demand too great a sacrifice of competing government
interests without sufficiently serving important First
Amendment values. Alas, there is a long list of such "special
circumstances," ranging from regulations of speech by
government employees, to regulations of speech on public
property, to regulations of speech by students, soldiers, and
prisoners, to regulations of the government's own speech, and to
regulations that compel individuals to disclose information to
the government. 42
In theory, of course, it would be possible to apply the
strict presumption against content-based regulation in all of the
aforementioned situations. But, as the Court came to recognize,
this would sometimes produce unwise and even foolish results.
Consider a high school mathematics teacher who asserts a First
Amendment right to preach Marxist doctrine instead of the
Pythagorean Theorem in her mathematics classroom. Or an IRS
employee who claims a First Amendment right to post
confidential tax returns on the internet. Or a taxpayer who
40 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: FirstAmendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 942-43 (1968).
41

Id.

42 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (government speech); Perry
Educators' Ass'n v. Perry Loc. Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (public property);
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Lab. Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prisoners); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1974) (soldiers); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (students); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (public employees);
Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (compelled disclosure).
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claims that the government cannot constitutionally create a
library or museum dedicated only to science or American
history. All of these examples regulate speech on the basis of
content, none involve low-value speech, and none pose the sort
of clear and imminent danger of grave harm that might
otherwise be sufficient to justify a content-based restriction of
speech. Must we, then, hold all of these regulations
unconstitutional? Examples such as these caused the Court to
rethink the scope of the strong presumption against contentbased restrictions. More specifically, they prompted the preRoberts Court to rethink two facets of that doctrine.
First, situations like the above examples caused the
Court to recognize that not all content-based restrictions are
equally threatening to core First Amendment values. On closer
inspection, the Court came to realize that regulations of
viewpoint are much more dangerous to fundamental First
Amendment values than other regulations of content, such as
regulations of the subject matter of expression or of the use of
profanity. Indeed, for many of the same reasons that contentbased restrictions were seen as different from and more
threatening than content-neutral restrictions, so too were
viewpoint-based restrictions seen as different from and more
threatening than other forms of content-based restrictions. That
is, viewpoint-based restrictions are more likely to distort public
debate in a politically biased manner and they are more likely to
be motivated by hostility to particular points of view.43
Another major development in the pre-Roberts Court free
speech jurisprudence concerns the other side of the content
based versus content neutral divide. Why do we care about laws
that do not regulate the content of speech? Consider a law that
prohibits any billboard in a residential area. This law does not
regulate the content of speech at all. One might therefore argue
that it has nothing to do with the First Amendment. One might
insist, in other words, that the First Amendment is about

censorship and that censorship is about regulating content.
Although this is a theoretically plausible approach, the preRoberts Court rightly rejected it.4 But that poses further
43 For illustrative decisions recognizing this distinction, see generally Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Perry, 460
U.S. 37; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Bethel School
DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,478 U.S. 675 (1986); and Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
" See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 491, 520-21
(1981) (plurality opinion) (holding that a billboard ordinance was invalid under the First
and Fourteenth Amendment because it "reache[d] too far into the realm of protected
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puzzles, for if content-neutral laws can violate the First
Amendment, we need to know how and why they threaten First
Amendment values.
To begin, it is important to note that content-neutral laws
come in many shapes and sizes. They include, for example, laws
prohibiting anyone to publish a newspaper, to hand out leaflets in
a public park, to contribute money to elect political candidates, to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, to appear naked
in public, or to knowingly destroy a draft card.46 Some of these
laws have a severe impact on the opportunities for free
expression, whereas others have only a trivial impact. Clearly, a
content-neutral law that has a severe impact on the opportunities
for free expression should be more likely to be unconstitutional
than a content-neutral law that has only a minor impact. Not
surprisingly, that turned out to be a central concern of the preRoberts Court in assessing the constitutionality of such laws. A
robust system of free expression assumes that individuals have
ample opportunities to express their views, and content-neutral
laws that significantly limit those opportunities should be more
closely scrutinized for that reason.
In dealing with such laws, the pre-Roberts Court
considered many possible factors, including: the restrictive
impact of the law, the ability of speakers to shift to other means
of expression, the substantiality of the state's interest, the ability
of the state to achieve its interest in a less speech-restrictive
manner, whether the speech involves the use of private property,
whether the speech involves the use of government property,
whether the means of expression has traditionally been allowed,
whether the regulation has a disparate impact on certain points
of view, whether there is a serious risk of impermissible
motivation, and whether the law is a direct or incidental
restriction of speech.46 In short, the pre-Roberts Court came to
analyze such laws with a form of ad hoc balancing.
Taking these principles into account, the pre-Roberts
Court shaped most of our First Amendment jurisprudence.
Given that these principles were adopted by many different
justices with widely varying perspectives over many decades, it

speech" and stating "[t]here can be no question that a prohibition on the erection of
billboards infringes freedom of speech").
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
4
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam);
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); City of Erie
v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-29 (1976); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43,
45, 50, 54 (1994); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141-49 (1943).
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is not surprising that there are inconsistencies, ambiguities,
conundrums, and perplexities in the doctrine. On the other
hand, by the early twentieth century, the Court, in my view, had
for the most part built a sensible and reasonably effective set of
principles for sorting First Amendment issues and for reaching
reasonably sound and predictable outcomes.
And now, with that, we can turn to the Roberts Court. I
should note that, when I say that, I am not implying anything
one way or the other about the Roberts Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. I leave that to my colleagues.

